Whether Using a Different, More Stringent, Standard of Review When a Trial Court Grants a Motion for New Trial than Utilized When a Trial Court Denies a Motion for New Trial Violates Due Process?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW This case is about the respect and deference that an appellate court owes a district court. Here, the district court listened to and observed the government’s only inculpatory witnesses on the charges at issue three informants whose testimony was inconsistent with each other, inconsistent with the crime scene evidence, and patently absurd and made the unusual, but painstakingly detailed, decision that the jury’s verdict of guilt was against the weight of the evidence and the interests of justice required Petitioner be granted a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The result-driven opinion by the Sixth Circuit panel majority over a lengthy, detailed, and logically persuasive dissenting opinion gave neither deference nor respect to the district court’s decision, and ignored the fact that the district court’s decision was informed by having actually seen and listened to the witnesses. Instead, the panel majority imposed a more stringent standard of review for when a district court grants a motion for new trial than when it denies such a motion and substituted its own, uninformed, view of the witnesses credibility for that of the district court. The panel majority’s opinion conflicts with the decisions of other courts of appeal, as well as prior decisions of the Sixth Circuit, and highlights the split of authority on these important issues which this Court must resolve. This case presents a significant, and unanswered, question of the appropriate scope of appellate review of a district court order granting a new trial order based on the trial judge's own observation of the evidence and witnesses. The Courts of Appeals are split, and deeply conflicted, in their answer to the question. Some Circuits, including the Sixth Circuit here, conduct an expansive review that defers to the jury's verdict, and applies a greater degree of scrutiny than that which is applied to an order that denies the new trial request. Other Circuits apply an appellate review that is circumscribed, defers to the discretion of the trial judge, and does not change based on the outcome of the trial court's new trial decision. In this case, an experienced trial court judge partially granted Petitioner a new trial because he concluded -based on "the weight of evidence" that he personally observed -that the jury's verdict was “against the manifest weight of the evidence.” The Sixth Circuit held that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting the new trial after applying a scope of appellate review that gave no deference to the trial judge's determination. Instead, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the trial judge overreached by weighing the evidence based on its own review of the record, and not deferring to the jury's decision. I. Whether Using a Different, More Stringent, Standard of Review When a Trial Court Grants a Motion for New Trial than Utilized When a Trial Court Denies a Motion for New Trial Violates Due Process? IL. Whether an Appellate Court is Free to Substitute its own Witness Credibility Determinations for that of the Trial Court Without Regard to the Trial Court Having Seen and Listened to the Witnesses Testimony? i Il. Whether a United States Court of Appeals May Effectively Abolish Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by Enacting a Different, More Stringent, Level of Review When a Trial Court Grants a Motion for New Trial that is Functionally Impossible to Meet? ii