Where the purpose of voir dire is to empanel an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, but an actual biased juror is not removed for cause, whether there can be any sound trial strategy attributed to trial counsel's actions thereby justifying the empaneling of a jury that is not impartial and essentially waiving a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights?

QUESTION PRESENTED “(If I felt the person was a homosexual I personally believe that the person is morally depraved enough that he might lie, might steel (sic), might kill.” (RT. 424). This was the unadulterated commentary of a juror serving at Petitioner’s trial. And it was these comments that led the Florida Supreme Court to conclude that this ‘juror showed actual bias stemming from [Petitioner's] sexual activity.” Patrick v. State, 246 So. 3d 253, 263 (Fla. 2018). In so concluding, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the idea that the juror was not biased against the defense because Petitioner is not homosexual: Although Patrick does not identify as homosexual and indicated in his confession that his sexual activity with men was for material support rather than personal fulfillment, these points do not eliminate the bias that this juror said he would feel based on the evidence that trial counsel and the trial court knew the jury would hear during trial. Also, the fact that the juror's bias would have extended to the victim does not refute the bias he acknowledged or render him impartial. Id. at 264. Despite finding this juror was actually biased against Petitioner, the Florida Supreme Court recognized the possibility that the decision by Petitioner’s counsel to not strike this juror was strategic, id. at 263-64, and ultimately, after remand for an evidentiary hearing in the circuit court, affirmed the circuit court’s finding that counsel exercised reasonable strategy in not striking the juror for cause. Patrick v. State, 302 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 2020). From these circumstances, Petitioner presents the following question: ii Where the purpose of voir dire is to empanel an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, but an actual biased juror is not removed for cause, whether there can be any sound trial strategy attributed to trial counsel’s actions thereby justifying the empaneling of a jury that is not impartial and essentially waiving a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights? iii