Right to counsel violation

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ; The right to counsel in this case was violated by the prosecution surreptitiously recording Petitioner after indictment and before arrest and arraignment in violation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), by ineffective and conflict-ladened performance by trial counsel and by appellate counsel mishandling the Massiah issues; by the trial court rushing unprepared counsel into trial on the same day he appeared in place of counsel who withdrew once he learned the devastating . statements on the tape recording upended his trial strategy; by representation by counsel in conflict with the client; by denying Rule 33 motions as untimely; by denying appointed substitute counsel after verdict for assistance in a new trial motion asserting the ineffectiveness and conflicts of interest of trial counsel although allowing trial counsel to withdraw due to the conflicts; by trial and appellate court rulings misconstruing this Court’s right to counsel decisions in Massiah; and by neglecting ineffective counsel in analyzing Massiah and other errors for prejudice. Petitioner raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and denial of counsel claims pro se at numerous points along the torturous path of this case through the courts, only to be met at every point with the response that the claims are not cognizable until heard at the trial court upon evidentiary hearing to amplify the otherwise cold record. And yet, Petitioner’s pro se effort to raise some of these counsel issues post-verdict and pre-sentencing by Rule 33(b)(2) motion was denied as untimely, albeit the untimeliness was due to neglect of the trial counsel that ii withdrew. As a result, his claims of trial error were denied by application of high burdens for him to show prejudice, neglecting the denials of the right to counsel responsible for causing or exacerbating the constitutional trial and appeals errors. . Once the appeals had run their course, Petitioner sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising a number of IAC and denial of counsel claims that had never been , . reviewed. The District Court Magistrate dismissed the § 2255 claims by rote / application. of the prior appeals holdings the error committed by counsel had been resolved against Petitioner so the IAC claims should also be dismissed as nonprejudicial. Petitioner was denied any hearing on his § 2255 motion's 12-page affidavit and additional submissions to give factual support to his claims. When Petitioner sought appellate review, his request for a certificate of appealability was denied. The “feedback loop” in this case has been fundamentally unfair, and Petitioner should have his § 2255 heard in an evidentiary hearing. This case presents the following questions: 1. When Petitioner in his motion for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 raises meritorious claims of denial of Sixth Amendment right to counsel, none of which has been previously reviewed, but the District Court denies relief without an evidentiary hearing and without application of proper legal principles, did the Court of Appeals err in denying a certificate of appealability? iii 2. When trial counsel is ineffective and conflict-disabled, should the denial of counsel be analyzed as Cuyler presumed error and a new trial required? 8. Did the trial court deny Petitioner counsel by forcing him to choose to keep conflicted retained counsel or retain substitute counsel, but would not consider appointing counsel on the ground Petitioner had previously waived appointed counsel because he intended to and did hire counsel but was now claiming indigence after his conflicted counsel was allowed to withdraw, so he was denied counsel and forced to proceed pro se? 4. When conflict-disabled and ineffective trial counsel failed to file a Rule 33(b)(2) motion on the ground of his own ineffectiveness and was allowed to withdraw for his conflict with Petitioner, and Petitioner requested to file his Rule 33(b)(2) motion