Does the participation of a conflicted and recused prosecutor in a death penalty trial violate due process?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED After the shooting deaths of the Kaufman County District Attorney (“DA”), his wife, and the First Assistant DA, a Kaufman County prosecutor drafted a motion to recuse the DA’s office from investigating and prosecuting the case due to the conflict of interest. The trial court judge granted the motion for good cause. That same prosecutor was a co-worker and friend of the decedents, a fact witness interviewed by the FBI, and expressed personal hatred toward Eric Williams, the man eventually charged with the murders. The conflicted prosecutor admitted that her perspective was “skewed” when it came to Mr. Williams, who she wanted to “get the needle.” Prosecutors pro tem were appointed to investigate and prosecute the case. The conflicted prosecutor, however, secretly helped. The DA Pro Tem referred to her as his “legal phone a friend.” Indeed, she drafted the arrest warrant, the indictments, and motions for him. The conflicted prosecutor attended meetings with the prosecutors pro tem and identified witnesses for them to use. The DA Pro Tem took her advice on which of the murders to prosecute, and shared secret, sensitive case information about the investigation with her. When the conflicted prosecutor’s secret involvement came to light after trial, Mr. Williams argued that her participation violated his due process rights. This Court, relying on its supervisory authority, held that it was improper for a criminal defendant to be prosecuted by a conflicted prosecutor. Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809 (1987). Many jurisdictions infer that this prohibition is grounded in due process, but are split on whether the participation of a conflicted prosecutor results in structural error. The state court held that the prosecutor’s involvement was harmless because she was not conflicted and did not act as a prosecutor on the case. Because this Court has not affirmatively decided whether there is a due process right to be tried by a disinterested prosecutor, the state court decision is an outlier among other courts that have held otherwise. Mr. Williams asks this Court to resolve these fundamental issues: (1) Does the participation of a conflicted and recused prosecutor in a death penalty trial violate due process? (2) Does the undisclosed participation of a conflicted prosecutor result in structural error that is “so fundamental and pervasive that [it] require[s] reversal without regard to the facts or circumstances of the particular case”? Young, 481 USS. at 809-10. ii