Whether a trial court may preclude all counsel from referencing the word 'mercy' during argument to the jury in the sentencing phase of a capital trial

QUESTIONS PRESENTED CAPITAL CASE 1. May a trial court, consistent with the requirements of the federal Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of a fundamentally fair trial in accordance with due process of law and a reliable and accurate determination of the facts underlying a sentence of death, and/or the protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and/or the right to the effective assistance of counsel, preclude all counsel from referencing the word “mercy” during argument to the jury in the sentencing phase of a capital trial? 2. May a trial court, consistent with the requirements of the federal Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of a fundamentally fair trial in accordance with due process of law and a reliable and accurate determination of the facts underlying a sentence of death, and/or the protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and/or the right to the effective assistance of counsel, refuse to instruct the jury in the sentencing phase of a capital trial that the concept of “mercy,” tethered to the circumstances of the crime and/or the background of the defendant, may be considered as a factor in mitigation of the sentence? i