Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second prosecution and punishment for Felony-murder and Felonious-assault following an acquittal on Aggravated-murder

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED (1.) Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bar a second , prosecution and punishment for the crimes of Felony-murder and Felonious assault following a prosecution for Aggravated Murder, Felony Murder and Felonious Assault? Which prosecution resulted in an acquittal on aggravated murder, and no event (hung jury) on felony murder and felonious assault. When the second prosecution presents the same case and evidence (ultimate issue of fact) as in the first trial. And felony murder and felonious assault are also lesser included offenses of aggravated murder of which the defendant was acquitted. (2.) How does the defendant's due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to not be convicted of a crime accept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt apply in this case. The prosecution's case clearly evidenced that someone “ ether than the defendant caused the death of the victim this fact resulted in an acquittal in the first trial. However, the state departs from this constitutional guarantee to sustain a conviction on behalf of the state in a second trial based upon these same facts. (3.) How does the Strickland Standard apply in this particular case? The defendant's appellate attorney fails to notify him of the Court of Appeals ruling affirming his conviction, causing him to miss the deadline to file an ; appeal in the State Supreme Court. This fact is not disputed. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denies certificate of appealability on this issue because it agreed with the State that defendant should have argued ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue in an application to reopen his appeal. Which completely departs from state and federal law that communications or the lack thereof fall outside of the record, and cannot be raised in an application to reopen his appeal that only deals exclusively with matters on the record. Which he supports with case law. Is this a departure from the Strickland Standard in order to deny certificate of appealability?