Whether the Sixth Circuit's decision to affirm the hearsay objection was contrary to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) and its progeny in that it violated Mr. Johnson's due process rights, his right to present a defense, his right to present evidence on his own behalf, and his right to confront the witnesses against him

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW A federal grand jury returned an eleven count indictment in which Mr. Johnson was a named defendant. Mr. Johnson was a named defendant in ten of the eleven counts. In short, the indictment accused Mr. Johnson of the following: e Three (3) counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Counts 4, 7, and 10); e Three (3) counts of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 3, 6, and 9); e Two (2) conspiracies to commit Hobbs Act robberies by robbing narcotics traffickers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Counts 1 and 5); e One (1) conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute five (5) kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 8); and e One count of carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Count 2). See Fifth Superseding Indictment (R. 225). This matter proceeded to a six (6) day jury trial. The Jury found Mr. Johnson guilty of carjacking (Count 2), one count of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count 3), one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Count 4), and conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (Count 8). The Jury found him not guilty of the two conspiracies to commit Hobbs Act robberies (Counts | and 5), the two remaining counts for using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Counts 6 and 9) and the two 2 remaining counts for being a felon in possession of a firearm (Counts 7 and 10). Mr. Johnson was sentenced to 371 months of imprisonment. The questions presented are as follows: 1. First Question. Mr. Johnson was convicted of carjacking Mr. Ricky Stevenson. On the day of the carjacking, Mr. Stevenson was driving Mr. Johnson and Mr. Johnson’s brother-in-law to purchase some marijuana and then to the store. The Memphis Police Department’s Incident Report, which was prepared by the responding police officer (Trace Cisneros), indicates that Mr. Stevenson told the officer that when the carjacking occurred, Mr. Johnson was in the front passenger seat of Mr. Stevenson’s vehicle, and the brother-in-law was seated in the back seat. At trial, however, Mr. Stevenson changed his story and testified that the brother-inlaw was in the front passenger’s seat and Mr. Johnson was seated in the backseat when the carjacking occurred. At trial, the district court sustained a hearsay objection and prohibited defense counsel from cross-examining the responding police officer about this discrepancy in Mr. Johnson’s location at the time of the carjacking. The first question presented is: e Whether the Sixth Circuit’s decision to affirm the hearsay objection was contrary to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) and its progeny in that it violated Mr. Johnson’s due process rights, his right to present a defense, his right to present evidence on his own behalf, and his right to confront the witnesses against him. 3 Second Question. The Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction for a a felon in possession of a firearm provides, in pertinent part, that the defendant “knowingly possessed a firearm specified in the indictment.” The district court failed to follow this pattern jury instruction, however, and erroneously instructed the jury that Mr. Johnson was required to possess the firearm “on the dates specified in the indictment” instead of instructing the jury that the firearm had to be specified in the indictment. That is, “the phrase ‘specified in the indictment’ modified ‘the dates’ instead of ‘a firearm.’” The pertinent part of the district court’s jury instruction reads as follows: “that the defendant, following his conviction, knowingly possessed a firearm on the dates specified in the indictment.” A plain reading of the district court’s instruction erroneously informs the jury that a defendant can be found guilty as long as he possessed any firearm on the dates