Whether the False Claims Act claim is viable for recovery of plaintiff's individual damages under 31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii) and whether the due process violations under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are material to the FCA liability

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This matter concerns an action brought under False Claims Act (FCA) provisions of S. 386, Pub. L. 111-21(2009) Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) 2009; and under Constitutionally protected due process rights grants of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint labored that although the Government has sustained damages by definition inherent the FCA Claim FERA § 4(b)(2)(A)(ii) plaintiff’s action under these ‘ same provisions is valid to pursue remedy of plaintiff’s damages not the Government’s. Indeed, “(Sec. 4 [of FERA (2009)) Amends the False Claims Act to: (1) expand liability under such Act for making false or fraudulent claims to the federal government; and (2) apply liability under such Act for presenting a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval (currently [/prior the 2009 amendments] limited to such a claim presented to an _ officer or employee of the federal government). ...” (Emp. added) (Congress.gov website). The U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals appears to disagree, rendering an opinion that does not clarify for the specific question of the validity of the FCA claim as brought and, further dismissed, at variance to consistent court teachings (including their ; own*), the permissive due process rights grounds material to the FCA claims. The Court’s review is sought to give direction respecting federal courts arbitrary applicability of the FCA claim as codified in 3/ U.S.C.§§ 3729-3733. The lower courts limit the FCA liability to the false claim made to the Government but the FCA claim clearly refutes this constraint in FERA 2009, where the Government damage is qualified in a “portion” of the FCA claim / the demand for payment, and 37 U.S.C.§3730 (b)(1) gives that the FCA claim may be brought for ‘the person’ [/plaintiff] and the Government. The FCA claim attaches defendant liability to “[an]other recipient” than the Government, 3] U.S.C. $3729 (b)(2)(A)(ii). Plaintiff contends that where the FCA claim extends to “[anJother recipient of the false claim for money, the scope of the FCA liability also extends to this Further, the Court’s review will instruct on the allowance of the Constitutionally protected due process rights of 42 U.S.C. $1983 grounds in this case as they inform the materiality element of the FCA claim. The questions are, 1) Under 31 U.S.C. $3729 (b)(2)(A)(ii) FERA § 4(b)(2)(A)(ii) of 31 U.S.C. $$ 3729-3733, is the FCA claim only viable for recovery of government damages and turns only on government participation, does the ‘other recipient’ of this false claim for money from the Government have grounds for remedy of plaintiff’ individual damages, that is, plaintiff’ (‘nongovernment’) portion of the FCA claim? 2) Do Court teachings support defendants due process violations of the Constitution’ ‘ Fourteenth Amendment codes in 42 U.S.C. $1983 material for FCA liability? *The Third Circuit cited Benn v. Universal Health Inc. (3d. cir. 2004)to dismiss for lack of standing in 42 USC $1983 at variance with standard Court teachings and the Third circuit’s prior application of those standards, in the argument that defendants are “private actors” and therefore not liable for the “state actions” of the complaint. i