Whether the Nevada state court's juror misconduct formulation, which conditions relief on juror misconduct being egregious to trigger the presumption of prejudice, is 'contrary to' the Mattox-Remmer presumption of prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

QUESTION PRESENTED In Nevada, when a juror commits misconduct by engaging in an unauthorized conversation about a criminal trial with a third party, the Nevada state courts do not presume the misconduct was prejudicial to the defendant unless it was “egregious” misconduct. If the misconduct was not “egregious,” according to the Nevada state courts, the burden of proving prejudice falls on the defendant. Under clearly established federal law—Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) and Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)— when a juror commits misconduct by engaging in an unauthorized conversation about a criminal trial with a third party, the misconduct is presumptively prejudicial to the defendant, and the government bears a heavy burden to overcome the presumption. The question presented is: Whether the Nevada state court’s juror misconduct formulation, which conditions relief on juror misconduct being egregious to trigger the presumption of prejudice, is “contrary to” the Mattox-Remmer presumption of prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). i