Whether a presiding judge must recuse/disqualify themselves when the judge has active teaching ties with a named-party university

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ; This case provides this Court with multiple instances for it to ground the _. criteria by which presiding judges, with different active relationships with a namedparty university, may rule over a case involving that university, without violating 28 U.S.C. § 455 and/or the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. It also allows the Court to determine whether interlocutory mandamus is appropriate , when a presiding judge denies a motion to disqualify and the appellate court does not substantively address whether the judge erred in denying disqualification. ' The presiding District Court Judge, despite stating he “hals] and will continue to ... servile], teach [forl, and hirle] students [from]” the named-Defendant ; university, denied the motion to recuse/disqualify himself from this case. His predecessor District Judge was a paid-employee teacher of the named-Defendant while presiding, never so disclosed, and recused himself after almost three and a : half years of actively presiding, simply stating “[flor good cause appearing,” and ruling his university’s teachers could not be held individually liable for defamation, . ; as it is within their scope of employment. The current presiding District Court Judge, also a teacher at the same university, refused to reconsider any of the ; . | recused judge’s orders or even hold a post-recusal status hearing to discuss the ~ extraordinary recusal of his colleague. , In May 2015, pro se Plaintiff, a student at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (‘UNLV’), sued UNLV, through the State of Nevada, as well as certain UNLV teachers, presidents, and administrators, for defamation, negligence, and other issues, in both their official and, where appropriate, individual capacities. At issue before the lower court is the university teachers’ scope of employment and \ individual liability. : ° ‘Two district court judges have presided over this case and both have multiple active extrajudicial relationships with the named-party university, which neither judge voluntarily disclosed. These undisclosed extrajudicial relationships include, : but are not limited to, actively teaching for a named-party, and/ or actively being paid by the named-party while presiding. ; After over three years of presiding over this case, the first presiding judge recused himself, in a sua sponte minute order, without forewarning, and for “good cause appearing.” Even upon recusal the recused-judge never disclosed he was being paid by the named-party university while presiding over this case as a university teacher. This same recused teacher-judge ruled in this case that the . named-party’s university teachers cannot be held individually liable for defamation — against their students. . The second, and currently presiding, district judge, also never disclosed he ‘ has several active extrajudicial relationships with the same named-party university. Only upon Plaintiffs disqualification motion did he admit he “hals] and’ will continue to ... servlel], teach [for], and hirle] students [from]” the named-party university's law school. . The district court denied Plaintiffs 28 U.S.C. § 455 motion for the second : judge’s disqualification under Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, due to personal interest in the case, of the recused-judge’s orders. It also denied Plaintiffs motion to certify these denials for interlocutory appeal. The appellate court denied mandamus . and a request for panel and/or en banc reconsideration. Trial is set to start in . January 2021 on the surviving six claims against two defendants. The questions presented are: , 1. Whether a presiding judge must recuse/ disqualify themselves, under 28 ; U.S.C. § 455, and/or the Due Process Clauses of the US Constitution, when +; the judge has active teaching ties with a named-party university before him/her, and at issue are:the university teacher’s scope of employment and individual liability. ; | 2. Whether interlocutory mandamus