No. 20-7808

James R. W. Mitchell v. California

Lower Court: California
Docketed: 2021-04-20
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP
Tags: client-autonomy mccoy-v-louisiana retroactivity sixth-amendment structural-error voluntary-manslaughter
Key Terms:
HabeasCorpus
Latest Conference: 2021-05-20
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Did defense counsel's alternative argument for voluntary manslaughter in defiance of petitioner's wishes violate petitioner's Sixth Amendment right of client autonomy as set out in McCoy?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1500, this Court held that a criminal defendant has a right of autonomy under the Sixth Amendment to dictate the ultimate goals of the representation. This includes the right to insist that defense counsel present a defense of complete innocence. (Jd. at pp. 1507-1509.) In McCoy, defense counsel violated that right when, knowingly and over the defendant’s objection, he conceded to the jury that the defendant committed the actus reus of a charged crime. (cite) This was structural error. (Jd. at p. 1511.) In California, under California’s own test for retroactivity, McCoy applies retroactively on collateral review to cases like petitioner’s that are otherwise final. (In re Smith (2020) 49 Cal. App. 5th 377, 391-392.) It is undisputed that, in this murder case, defense counsel knew throughout the representation of petitioner’s insistence on a defense of complete innocence and his refusal of a defense based on mental state. 1. Regardless of whether defense counsel’s remarks amounted to a concession of the actus reus of homicide, did defense counsel’s alternative argument for voluntary manslaughter in defiance of petitioner’s wishes violate petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right of client autonomy as set out in McCoy? i 2. Under McCoy, does a concession of guilt require an explicit concession? Even though defense counsel never said, “I concede that petitioner killed the victim,” did he nonetheless concede the actus reus of homicide when, after arguing for an acquittal grounded substantially in petitioner’s testimony of third party culpability, he began his alternative argument for a manslaughter conviction by saying petitioner would not approve of it and by twice invoking his duties as an officer of the court to tell the jury the evidence suggested petitioner lied on the stand? ii

Docket Entries

2021-05-24
Petition DENIED.
2021-05-05
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 5/20/2021.
2021-04-26
Waiver of right of respondent California to respond filed.
2021-04-12
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due May 20, 2021)

Attorneys

California
Peggy S. RuffraCalifornia Department of Justice, Respondent
James R. W. Mitchell
Steven S. LublinerLaw Off of Steven S. Lubliner, Petitioner