Whether, when applying plain-error review based on the Court's intervening decision in Rehaif, a circuit court of appeals errs in relying on a petitioner's stipulation of prior felony conviction for the jury to 'infer' petitioner had knowledge of his status to prove that element of § 922(g) beyond a reasonable doubt and to conclude that the petitioner's substantial rights were not affected

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW This Court has made clear that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of a person accused of a crime to due process and to a trial by an impartial jury “requires that each element of a crime be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 104 (2013). Recently the Court recognized that the elements of the offense of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), includes that the defendant “knew he had the relevant status” as a felon at the time of possessing the firearm. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194, 204 L. Ed. 2d 594 (2020). The knowledge-of-status element is ‘‘a basic element of the crime;” but in pre-Rehaif trials the government “presented no evidence whatsoever to prove that basic element. * * * The simple, inevitable conclusion is that [such a] conviction fails to satisfy the Federal Constitution’s demands.” Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 229, 121 S. Ct. 212 (2001). Of course, the government presented no evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of his or her status because the government was, at the time, unaware of the element. So, too, were defendants, who failed to object to the knowledge-of-status element appearing in the indictment, the jury instructions, or in the jury’s consideration for whether all elements of the offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, many defendants’ Rehaif-based challenges are reviewed for plain error, including whether the error was plain and affected the substantial rights of the defendant. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993). Post-Rehaif, a circuit split exists as to whether, under plain error review, a defendant’s stipulation that he was a felon is sufficient for a circuit court to conclude that the jury would have inferred that the defendant also knew that he was a felon and, thus, that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Third Circuit has definitely answered, no, that “Rehaif itself blocks that line of reasoning” because the Court reported it did not believe Congress would have expected defendants “to know their own status.” United States v. Nasir, 982 F.3d 144, 172 (3d Cir. 2020). The Sixth Circuit has taken the opposite approach, creating a circuit conflict, finding that when a defendant enters an Old Chief stipulation, the jury can infer that the defendant knew that he was a felon and, thus, that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. United States v. Ward, 957 F.3d 691, 696 (6" Cir. 2020). See, also, United States v. Greer, 798 Fed. Appx. 483, 486 (11" Cir. 2020) (pointing to evidence in the record from which a jury could infer that he knew he was a felon barred from possessing firearms), cert. granted, 208 L. Ed. 2d 510, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 486 (mem.), (U.S., Jan. 8, 2021). Accordingly, the questions for the Court is whether, when applying plain-error review based on the Court’s an intervening decision in Rehaif, a circuit court of appeals errs in relying on a petitioner’s stipulation of prior felony conviction for the jury to “infer” petitioner had knowledge of his status to prove that element of § 922(g) beyond a reasonable doubt and to conclude that the petitioner’s substantial rights were not affected. i