Is counsel relieved of the duty to investigate and present all reasonably available mitigating evidence in a capital case if he chooses to present a residual doubt defense?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Question One In Mr. Franks’s case, the district court found that “the evidence ...was so overwhelming that no competent lawyer could be expected to have secured an acquittal.” Pet. App. 3 at 14 (emphasis added). Indeed, Mr. Franks’s own trial counsel conceded his guilt at trial, opening his closing arguments by informing the jury, “David Franks is guilty, there’s no question from the evidence.” D.1714:3549-50. Yet counsel purportedly relied on a residual doubt/coercion theory at sentencing, sacrificing the thorough investigation into mitigating evidence that this Court requires. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has credited counsel’s approach, finding that residual doubt is “perhaps the best” sentencing strategy that counsel can employ during the penalty phase of a capital case, and counsel “cannot be held to be ineffective when he has taken a line of defense which is objectively reasonable.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1320 n. 28 (11th Cir. 2000). In other words, the Eleventh Circuit insulates an attorney from a finding of ineffectiveness if they have chosen to pursue a residual doubt defense, no matter how ill-conceived it was to do so. Is counsel relieved of the duty to investigate and present “all reasonably available mitigating evidence,” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2008), ina capital case if he chooses to present a residual doubt defense? i Question Two The Eleventh Circuit has also said that substance abuse evidence is “invariably a two-edged sword” that will “[r]arely, if ever” be so mitigating that all reasonable counsel would present it during the penalty phase of a capital case, so trial counsel can never be ineffective for failing to do so. See, e.g., Stewart v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 476 F.8d 11938, 1217 (11th Cir. 2007). Yet this Court has repeatedly found that substance abuse evidence is highly mitigating, particularly when it is linked to cognitive impairments and childhood trauma. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). Is substance abuse evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case “invariably” a double-edged sword, such that counsel has no duty to investigate or present it as mitigating evidence, regardless of the circumstances of the case? ii