How to determine when a juvenile sentenced to life in prison without parole or its functional equivalent prior to Miller v. Alabama is entitled to a new sentencing hearing

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259, __U.S.__, 141 S.Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2021), this Court reaffirmed, when reviewing a post-Miller sentencing hearing, that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 40 (2011), mandates that “a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence” on a juvenile homicide offender, though the sentencer need not make an explicit finding of incorrigibility (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483). This Court has also held that Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208, 212-13 (2016). However, as the Illinois Supreme Court noted in the decision at issue here, “th[is] Court [has] offered no guidance about how to determine whether a sentencing hearing held before Miller was decided nonetheless comported with its requirements.” People v. Lusby, No. 124046. __N.E. 3d__, 2020 IL 124046, 935 (Oct. 20, 2020) (emphasis added). Moreover, States throughout the country, as well as the justices of the Illinois Supreme Court who decided this case, are divided on this issue. The question presented is how to determine when a juvenile sentenced to life in prison without parole or its functional equivalent prior to Miller, when the sentencing court did not have the benefit of Miller, is entitled to a new sentencing hearing, to ensure the juvenile’s sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. i