Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments forbid sentencing guidelines from enhancing the presumed reasonable punishment for an offense, unless the facts used by those guidelines to enhance the presumed penalty are found by a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard after indictment

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), expressly overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), and at least implicitly overturned McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). Did McMillan’s rejection also fatally undermine two cases that depend upon it, Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995); and United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997)? Consequently: a. does the Fifth Amendment forbid sentencing guidelines from enhancing the presumed reasonable punishment for an offense, unless the facts used by those guidelines to enhance the presumed penalty are found by a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard after indictment? b. does the Sixth Amendment forbid a judge, instead of a jury, finding the facts that enhance a presumed reasonable punishment? 2. May sentencing courts insert their own suppositions over a party’s demonstration; deem statistical and empirical data “too abstract to bear meaningfully on... sentence”; and reject its own observation that the defendant before the bar is different from the original defendant sentenced? Or are such deviations factual flaws fatal to procedural and substantive reasonableness?