Whether strict shotgun pleading rules are permissible to dispose of complaints and deprive litigants equal access to federal courts

QUESTIONS PRESENTED “... Mindful of... Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”)” Bickerstaff Clay Prod. v. Harris Cty., 89 F.3d 1481, 1487 n. 9 (11th Cir. 1996). See also Magluta, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to address... serious constitutional issues on the basis ofa . . . ‘shotgun’ pleading. . . .) Gutierrez v. ILN.S., 745 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1984). The first broad question is whether strict shotgun pleading rules, a category of heightened standard, is permissible as used (excessively) in the Eleventh Circuit to dispose of complaints and deprive litigants equal access to federal courts to seek equal justice, relief and secure their constitutional rights on the merits under 42 US.C. §1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment? Alternatively, the specific subsidiary questions are: a) Whether this Court would reconsider the Ashwander rule and define the scope of “some other ground” language so that an Article III court could review a seri: ous constitutional question or claim and not to dismiss and deny justice based solely on pleading technicality? b) Whether the Courts should have reviewed and provided specific guidance for each claim in pro se Petitioners’ complaint to help narrow the issues and correct the deficiencies with limited discovery and a hearing instead of dismissing with prejudice the entire pleading? ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued c) Whether it is required to identify and name all individuals involved when they act in a collective body such as the City Code Enforcement Board or the City Commission, and to separate the claim for each individual being sued in official capacity under 42 U.S.C. §1983, §1985 and §1986? d) Whether each government official can be held liable in an individual or personal capacity when they act under custom policies or regulations with overlapping, conflicting, vague and confusing provisions that could be invalid or unconstitutional? The second broad question is whether the Supreme Court would reconsider the “Finality requirement” in Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. 172, and define the scope of the final decision, particularly when the final decision requires an exhaustion of administrative remedies that include quasi-judicial hearing, state trial, appellate courts, and involve more than one government agency and several intertwining regula: tions? Alternatively, whether the finality requirement and exhaustion of administrative remedies preclude all Petitioners’ claims under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 & 1986?