Whether a federal court is bound only by the decisions of the Supreme Court in determining whether a state court has unreasonably applied clearly established federal law

QUESTIONS PRESENTED During opening statements at Petitioner’s murder trial, his counsel promised the jury that it would hear from the only eyewitness. Counsel later reneged on that promise without explanation. Instead of hearing from the eyewitness—who has sworn that he would have taken sole responsibility for the murder—the jury was left to draw the inference that his account would have been harmful to Petitioner’s case. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 55 years in prison. On state post-conviction review, he argued that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The state courts denied relief, conflating counsel’s broken promise with a run-of-the-mill decision not to call a witness at trial. Petitioner then raised the same claim on federal habeas review, invoking on-point circuit precedent recognizing that a state court unreasonably applies Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), when it denies relief despite counsel’s inexplicable broken promise to the jury to put on critical testimony. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that “this [argument] relies only on our Court,” and “[a]lthough we think highly of our own decisions, we are not the Supreme Court.” Pet. App. 4a. This case presents two questions: 1. Isa federal court bound only by the decisions of this Court in determining whether a state court has unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law” as announced by this Court? 2. Is the Sixth Amendment violated when counsel promises a jury critical evidence and then breaks that promise without apparent justification?