Whether the district court erred in holding that it lacked authority after the sentence became final to designate an alternate State under 18 U.S.C. 3596(a), which would mean that a federal death sentence validly imposed under the FDPA becomes permanently unenforceable if the State in which the sentence was imposed later repealed its own death penalty

QUESTION PRESENTED In 2001, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland imposed on respondent Dustin John Higgs nine sentences of death based on respondent’s convictions for the kidnapping and murder of three women on federal land beside the Parkway. Under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA), 18 U.S.C. 3591 et seq., “[w]hen the sentence is to be implemented,” a United States marshal “shall supervise implementation of the sentence in the manner prescribed by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed. If the law of the State does not provide for the implementation of a sentence of death, the court shall designate another State” as an alternate. 18 U.S.C. 3596(a). At the time of respondent’s sentencing, the State of Maryland had death-penalty laws, and so his criminal judgment incorporated the FDPA but did not designate an alternate State. The State of Maryland, however, subsequently repealed its state-law capital punishment regime. The question presented is: Whether the district court erred in holding that it lacked authority after the sentence became final to designate an alternate State under 18 U.S.C. 3596(a), which would mean that a federal death sentence validly imposed under the FDPA becomes permanently unenforceable if the State in which the sentence was imposed later repealed its own death penalty. (D)