Whether the court deprives a plaintiff of her First Amendment right to free-speech, whether the court misapplies the but-for causation test in a Title-VII-retaliation case

QUESTIONS PRESENTED INTRODUCTION Petitioner H. Renee James is a former police officer with the City of Montgomery, Alabama, who was a fourteen-year veteran at the time her employment was terminated. During her employment, James suffered what she alleged were multiple unfounded or unfair disciplinary actions based on her race (black) or her sex (female), which culminated in her termination from employment with the Police Department, allegedly under the City’s progressive discipline policy, but which James asserted was pursuant to impermissible discrimination and retaliation due to her filing of the instant lawsuit. The district court and the Eleventh Circuit both found that James had failed to meet her burden to survive summary judgment as to either her claim of discrimination or retaliation. In particular, the Eleventh Circuit found that an _ allegedly insubordinate email James sent to the Chief of Police (and others) shortly before her termination was a “major” employment violation; that James had two prior “major”? employment violations; and_ that James’s termination was therefore “the culmination of the Department’s policy.” Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit found that James did not establish “but-for” causation in order to survive summary judgment. ii The questions presented are: 1. Whether the court deprives a plaintiff of her First Amendment right to free speech and expression when, in applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in an employment case on summary judgment, the court finds that an employer may discipline an employee based on the employee’s candid response to a request for “feedback” about the work environment, and then later rely on that discipline to terminate her employment. 2. Whether on summary judgment in a Title VII retaliation case, the court misapplies the “but-for” causation test when it allows an employer to avoid liability by citing to some other factor that allegedly contributed to the challenged employment decision, rather than recognizing that events often have multiple “but-for” causes that raise conflicting inferences about an employer’s intent that require a jury to determine.