Whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been improperly expanded beyond its First-Amendment-protections to insulate knowingly-false-statements

QUESTIONS PRESENTED According to this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, “the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection[,]” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964), and “the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). A jury found Respondents liable for Business Disparagement (as well as other state-law liabilities), because they “published a disparaging false statement” and “knew the falsity,” “acted with reckless disregard,” or “acted with ill will or intended to interfere.” Respondents nevertheless negated the liability by invoking a First Amendment doctrine known as “NoerrPennington,” whichis applied in markedly inconsistent ways by the circuits. The questions presented are as follows: 1. Whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been improperly expanded beyond its First Amendment moorings to insulate knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally false statements. 2. Whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is irreconcilable with jury findings against Respondents in this matter—all of which were premised on “appropriate standard[s] of liability” established by the state of Texas, which parallel the outward limits of First Amendment protections. il 3. Whether these errors were sufficiently presented to the courts below.