Whether the 'objective inquiry' required by Davis may be based on subjective factors

QUESTION PRESENTED Long established precedent of this Court requires law enforcement officers to cease interrogating a suspect upon assertion of his right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). To assert the right to counsel, a suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). Davis held that “[t]o avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry.” Id. at 458-59 (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987)) (emphasis added). At least six federal circuits and ten state high courts, however, consider subjective factors, such as the beliefs of the interrogating officer and the underlying motivations of the suspect, to determine whether suspects have invoked their right to counsel. By contrast, a separate group of federal circuits and state high courts reject such subjective analyses, understanding them to be expressly prohibited by Davis. The question presented is: Whether the “objective inquiry” required by Davis may be based on subjective factors. ii STATEMENT OF