Whether the Seventh Circuit's invalidation of Wilber's conviction comports with the limits on federal authority to overturn State convictions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

QUESTION PRESENTED During Danny Wilber’s jury trial in 2005 for fatally shooting a man at a party, Wilber became increasingly belligerent with the Milwaukee County Circuit Court and its staff. The court ordered escalating non-visible restraints on Wilber to try to control his behavior. This was for naught; on the last day of trial, Wilber got in a fistfight with the four deputies escorting him to the courtroom despite his wearing a stun belt. So, the trial court ordered him shackled to a wheelchair during closing arguments and verdict. The Seventh Circuit invalidated Wilber’s 16-yearold conviction for this murder on the grounds that, though the trial court went to great lengths to explain why each progressive security measure it was imposing was necessary, it failed to specifically articulate why the final shackles had to be visible. It determined the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision affirming Wilber’s conviction was thus an unreasonable application of Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005). The question presented is whether the Seventh Circuit’s invalidation of Wilber’s conviction comports with the limits on federal authority to overturn State convictions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.