Was counsel's performance deficient, and did the courts below apply the right standard?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED State courts must appropriately apply the standards for counsel’s performance outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to survive federal habeas review; federal courts must apply this Court’s precedent when a habeas petitioner asserts innocence, see McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013). Here, right after a longtime police officer picked up a gun and shot himself in the foot, he repeatedly said he did not touch the trigger. The State of Tennessee charged Edward Kendrick with shooting his wife with the same gun earlier that night, though Kendrick also said he did not touch the trigger. At trial, the state’s firearm expert said that was “impossible,” and Kendrick’s lawyer offered no rebuttal expert; the officer could not remember where his hands were, and Kendrick’s lawyer failed to admit the officer’s prior statements. In state post-conviction, an expert showed the trigger mechanism had a history of accidental discharges, and counsel admitted his uninformed choices. One court vacated the conviction, but, relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Sixth Circuit affirmed another court’s conclusion that Kendrick received constitutionally sufficient representation. The habeas court also rejected this proof of innocence to overcome procedural default. Was counsel’s performance deficient, and did the courts below apply the right standard? Where the habeas court required “clear and convincing” proof of innocence rather than the applicable “more likely than not” showing, is Kendrick owed relief?