Where a state's highest criminal court finds constitutional error but holds the record on direct appeal is insufficient to require reversal, does due process require that the state postconviction court afford the postconviction petitioner an opportunity to present the evidence in support of his attorney ineffectiveness claim?

QUESTION PRESENTED Mr. Calvert, proceeding pro se, was made to wear a shock cuff and leg brace throughout his capital trial. Mid-trial, deputies activated the shock cuff, causing Mr. Calvert to scream. Though jurors were not in the courtroom at the time, they were in the hallway adjacent to it. Counsel interjected that he “highly suspected” jurors heard Mr. Calvert’s screams. On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “activating the shock cuff as a means to get Appellant to stand up when addressing the trial court violates due process.” However, the court affirmed the conviction because there was “no evidence that the shock cuff’s activation had a negative effect on the jurors’ impartiality or the presumption of innocence.” In state postconviction proceedings, Mr. Calvert alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence that jurors heard and were impacted by Mr. Calvert’s screams. Despite Mr. Calvert’s proffer from an alternate juror that she, while with other jurors, heard the screams, the postconviction court precluded Mr. Calvert from presenting evidence in support of his ineffectiveness claim. The question presented is: Where a state’s highest criminal court finds constitutional error but holds the record on direct appeal is insufficient to require reversal, does due process require that the state postconviction court afford the postconviction petitioner an opportunity to present the evidence in support of his attorney ineffectiveness claim?