DueProcess JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether the Louisiana appellate court applied an impermissibly high burden of proof at the first step of Batson by creating an unattainable statistical threshold and refusing to consider non-numerical evidence of discrimination
QUESTION PRESENTED During Petitioner Boys’ jury selection, prosecutors used eight of eleven peremptory strikes on Black jurors. Four of these Black jurors were asked no substantive questions by the State and gave no responses beyond basic demographic information, which was indistinguishable from that of seated white jurors. Defense counsel objected under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and argued that the State’s strike pattern established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The State responded, “We simply based our cuts on the responses provided to the State.” App. lla. The trial court denied the Batson challenge at the first step. On appeal, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit ruled that the pattern of strikes did not satisfy the threshold for a prima facie showing, noting that numerical evidence alone can never establish a prima facie case. Also, despite the fact that Louisiana courts routinely consider all aspects of jury selection, whether raised at trial or not, when denying relief at the first step of Batson, the appellate court refused to consider any aspect of jury selection beyond strike statistics on the ground that trial counsel had addressed only numerical evidence in his Batson objection. The question presented is: Whether, in conflict with Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), the Louisiana appellate court applied an impermissibly high burden of proof at the first step of Batson by creating an unattainable statistical threshold and refusing to consider non-numerical evidence of discrimination that was not explicitly articulated in defense counsel’s objection.