Whether federal courts can evaluate prudential standing before addressing Article III jurisdiction

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Court has held that federal courts (1) may adjudicate jurisdictional issues in any sequence they choose and (2) may, under appropriate circumstances, assume jurisdiction in order to decide non-jurisdictional threshold issues that do not involve the merits. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999); Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 435-36 (2007). Here, the Second Circuit assumed Article III jurisdiction in order to dismiss the case for lack of prudential standing. The Questions Presented are: 1. In light of Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014)’s holding that many types of prudential standing doctrines are misnomers and actually address merits issues, are the last vestiges of these doctrines properly treated as part of the merits (rather than standing) such that federal courts cannot evaluate them before addressing Article III jurisdiction? 2. In light of the “deep and important circuit split” regarding the jurisdictional nature of prudential standing, Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 938 (8th Cir. 2013); Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), is prudential standing jurisdictional such that federal courts can always evaluate it before addressing Article III jurisdiction? ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued 3. If, despite Lexmark, 572 U.S. 118, prudential standing remains a non-merits issue, could the Second Circuit sidestep the question of Article III standing when the Article III issues pose no particularly complicated or novel issues? 4. Did petitioners’ preexisting proprietary interest establish Article III standing and a non-champertous claim?