Whether a Panel of the Circuit Court erred when it dismissed an appeal holding that there is no appellate jurisdiction to consider on the merits whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction

QUESTION PRESENTED This is a case in which the Defendants removed the matter to federal district court claiming there was diversity jurisdiction even though there were 4 Floridacitizen Plaintiffs and 2 Florida-citizen Defendants. The district court entered final judgment in favor of all 3 Defendants against all 4 Plaintiffs on a motion for entry of consent final judgment filed by the Plaintiffs because of the obvious lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A Panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear the matter on the merits and dismissed the appeal claiming it did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction or not, even though there were multiple parties on both sides of the “v.” who had Florida-state citizenship. Whether a Panel of the Circuit Court erred when it dismissed an appeal holding that there is no appellate jurisdiction to consider on the merits whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction (“smj”) to issue a final judgment involving 4 Florida-citizen Plaintiffs and 2 Florida-citizen Plaintiffs, based on its belief that Plaintiffs conferred smj on the district court, or waived the ability to contest whether the district court had smj by consenting to the entry of a final judgment in favor of Defendants. The Panel decision is directly contrary to: Clark v. Housing Auth. of Alma, 971 F.2d 723, 726 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that an exception to the general rule that one who consents to the entry of a final judgment ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued waives his right to appeal is where “there is a lack of federal jurisdiction because of the citizenship of the parties”) (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928) (Brandeis, J.)) (citing Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289 (1879)). Swift & Co. and Ketchum both hold that a circuit court has the power to determine whether a district court has smj in precisely the situation here—where one party consents to the entry of final judgment to contest diversity jurisdiction. Here, this Court should GVR the circuit court’s refusal to hear the matter on its merits, e.g., determine whether the district court had smj, because the circuit court’s decision is directly contrary to pellucid Supreme Court precedent. We cannot fathom American jurisprudence allowing a Circuit Court of Appeals to conclude it does not have the authority to determine whether a district court was possessed with smj, when there is a complete lack of diversity jurisdiction, as the end result is district courts unconstitutionally assuming jurisdiction over cases where smj does not exist, which would result in such assumptions of jurisdiction being nonappealable.