Whether, as in civil cases, a clear indication of congressional intent is required to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of a United States criminal statute

QUESTION PRESENTED In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., this Court established a presumption against applying a statute extraterritorially that can only be overcome by a “clear indication” that Congress intended for the statute to apply abroad. 561 U.S. 247, 255, 261 (2010). This presumption applies “in all cases.” Id. at 261. Three years later, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., this Court confirmed that a statute must “evince a ‘clear indication of before it can be applied abroad. 569 U.S. 108, 118 (2013) (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. 265). This Court again confirmed this rule in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, explaining that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” 579 U.S. 325, 335 (2016) (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255). This is consistent with the Court’s declaration that any “lingering doubt” as to whether Congress intended for a statute to apply extraterritorially must be resolved against extraterritorial application. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203 (1998). Here, the court below found the presumption against extraterritorial application of a criminal statute was rebutted based on a mere inference of congressional intent and a purported “logical conclusion” of how to interpret the statutory text. The question presented is: Whether, as in civil cases, a clear indication of congressional intent is required to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of a United States criminal statute.