Whether the state courts disregarded Supreme Court precedent by requiring the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution's knowing use of and failure to correct false testimony affected the verdict, rather than requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false testimony did not affect the verdict

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole based on the identification testimony of a single eyewitness who was to be sentenced in federal court for possession with intent to distribute ten kilograms of cocaine. The state prosecutor, who had agreed to write a letter to the federal judge on the witness’s behalf, elicited his false testimony that no one had promised him anything or told him that his punishment range would be reduced or that he would receive a lower sentence. After petitioner was convicted, the prosecutor wrote a letter to the federal judge that the witness’s testimony “alone convinced the jury of the [petitioner’s] guilt,” and the witness received probation. The state habeas trial court found that the prosecutor had knowingly elicited and failed to correct the witness’s false testimony, but that petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the false testimony affected the verdict, as it did not impeach the witness’s identification. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) denied relief without written order, which requires this Court to “look through” that denial to the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as the basis for the denial. The questions presented are: I. Did the state courts—by requiring petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution’s knowing use of and failure to correct false testimony affected the verdict—disregard this li QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued Court’s precedent requiring that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false testimony did not affect the verdict? II. Did the state courts—by concluding that an eyewitness’s false testimony that he had not been promised consideration was immaterial because impeaching his motive to testify would not impeach his identification of this Court’s precedent holding that impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence are the same for purposes of a materiality analysis? iii RELATED CASES e State v. Uvukansi, No. 1353181, 174th District Court of Harris County. Judgment entered June 20, 2014. e Uvukansi v. State, No. 01-14-00527-CR, First Court of Appeals of Texas. Judgment entered June 2, 2016. e =Uvukansi v. State, No. PD-0727-16, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Judgment entered October 19, 2016. e =6Ex parte Uvukansi, No. 1353181-A, 174th District Court of Harris County. Judgment entered April 2, 2019. e Ex parte Uvukansi, No. WR-88,493-02, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Judgment entered April 14, 2021. e =Uvukansi v. Lumpkin, No. 4:21CV1624, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Pending.