Whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Questions Presented are: 1. Rule 2.11 of the Code of Conduct and as pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Cannon 3C(1) of the Code of United States Judges applies that a judge shall disqualify or recuse himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might . reasonably be questioned, This Court ruled that “Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, | “the probability of actual bias on the part of the | judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable,” should this Court overrule its standing in Rippo v. Baker? 2. A federal judge should recuse himself if “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might rea. sonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 144; 28 U.S.C. § 455; Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987? 3. The district court prefiling sanction against pro se Curry-Malcolm was improperly imposed and conflicts with other circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, See Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1990)). Whether prefiling sanctions ordered and entered without notice and opportunity to be heard are unconstitutional and should they be used as a mechanism to deprive pro se litigants of their rights to due process? See Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998); Malcolm v. Ass’n of Supervisors & Adm’rs of Rochester, 388 F. Supp. 3d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in part, ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued ; vacated in part, remanded, 831 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Malcolm I”); Goldman v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 830 P.2d 107 (Nevada 1992). 4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., New York State Human Rights Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 US.C. § 1983, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination, whether an employer’s continuing wrongful conduct and actions in an employment discrimination case precludes the plaintiff from bringing subsequent actions against the employer? The Court of Appeals stance on appellant’s claims of continuing wrong and continuing violation of unlawful discrimination and retaliation against her by her employer, including post-employment discrimination and retaliation, contradicts this Court ruling in Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions (2020). 5. Whether pro se litigant established a contractual employer-employee relationship when the plaintiff-appellant factually stated that she was employed with the Rochester City School District and there was a binding employment contract? . 6. Whether it was congressional intent to allow employers to skirt the constitution and human rights laws where the employer defends, condones, participates in and chooses the same “similar conduct” method of unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory and/or performed by the employer, its , iii QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued . employees, officers and/or agents on different days and occurring at different times, by the same and/or different actors, and subsequent to the first, second, third ..., and so on in violation of Title VII, ADEA, New York State Human Rights Law, 42 US.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Age Discrimination Act of 1967? 7. The Second Circuit overreached in its affirmation when it exceeded in its jurisdiction by per se ruling on a remand by another panel within the Court. See Malcolm v. Ass’n of Supervisors & Adm’rs of Rochester, 388 F. Supp. 3d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2019), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 831 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2020) (Malcolm I). The panel’s : ruling in this instant appeal is in direct contradic| tion to the remand and sets up confusion on a combined case that is now pending in its jurisdiction that has not been briefed. Whether by doing so the panel improperly overreached in its power to determine an appeal not before the panel, and whether the panel actions violate the pro se litigant