Did the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals err in holding that the prosecution's reliance on admittedly false DNA evidence to secure petitioner's conviction and death sentence is consistent with the federal Due Process clause because there is no reasonable likelihood that the false DNA evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury?

QUESTION PRESENTED Petitioner Areli Carbajal Escobar was convicted of capital murder in Texas state court largely based on false DNA evidence and sentenced to death. After his conviction, the State of Texas discovered serious deficiencies in the laboratory conducting the DNA testing, ultimately closing the facility altogether. On petitioner’s application for habeas relief, the state habeas court below found that the DNA evidence used to convict him was false, misleading, and unreliable, and material to his conviction. Thus, the court recommended that relief be granted on his federal due process claim. Although the State initially opposed habeas relief, it changed its position when the case reached the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA), agreeing that petitioner’s federal due process rights were violated and that he is entitled to have his capital conviction overturned. Despite the agreement of petitioner, the prosecution, and the habeas court, the CCA denied relief, holding that petitioner’s federal due process rights were not violated because he had failed to show any reasonable likelihood that the false DNA evidence could have affected the jury’s judgment. In doing so, the CCA did not even acknowledge the State’s contrary view. The question presented is: Did the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals err in holding that the prosecution’s reliance on admittedly false DNA evidence to secure petitioner’s conviction and death sentence is consistent with the federal Due Process clause because there is no_ reasonable likelihood that the false DNA evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury?