Whether lower courts must follow the standard established by this Court's precedent for an element of a plaintiff's statutory claim, even if, in the court's judgment, the plaintiff's allegations implicate the court's 'supervisory responsibilities'

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court has repeatedly held—twice in reversing the Second Circuit—that private claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may be brought only by plaintiffs injured “directly” by the alleged wrongdoing. Such claims therefore generally do not extend to injuries “beyond the first step” of the causal chain. Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269, 271 (1992); see also Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 460 (2006); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654 (2008); Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010). This limitation “has particular resonance when applied to claims,” like those here, “brought by economic competitors.” Anza, 547 U.S. at 460. Applying this standard, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's RICO claims. But the Second Circuit reversed, explicitly deviating from this Court’s RICO proximate-causation precedents. It held that, because the plaintiff alleged fraud on bankruptcy courts, the allegations implicated the court’s “supervisory responsibilities” and thus allowed the court to apply a relaxed proximate-cause rule that “differs somewhat from the analysis in” this Court’s RICO decisions. The question presented is: Whether lower courts must follow the standard established by this Court’s precedent for an element of a plaintiffs statutory claim, even if, in the court’s judgment, the plaintiffs allegations implicate the court’s “supervisory responsibilities.”