When, if ever, does the Constitution permit the court-martial of retired servicemembers for offenses committed after their discharge from active duty?

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court has long held that the Constitution prohibits the peacetime court-martial of civilians for any offense, even those committed in foreign combat zones during prior service in the armed forces. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). This Court has also held that active-duty servicemembers may be court-martialed for any offense, even civilian crimes with no connection to the military. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). But this Court has never addressed which of these rules applies to retired servicemembers—who, by statute, remain subject to non-Article III military prosecution in perpetuity for any civilian or military offense Congress prescribes, even those committed long after they have retired. The lone Article III court to consider the issue in the past half-century recently held that the extension of military jurisdiction to retirees for post-retirement offenses is unconstitutional. Larrabee v. Braithwaite, 502 F. Supp. 3d 322 (D.D.C. 2020). In Petitioner’s case, however, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) came to the opposite conclusion. The Question Presented is: When, if ever, does the Constitution permit the court-martial of retired servicemembers for offenses committed after their discharge from active duty?