Whether a liberty interest claim was properly preserved for appeal

QUESTION PRESENTED 1. Whether in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceedings, when the pro se litigant initially only argued his property interest in the complaint and then claimed with developed argumentation in the motion for reconsideration that he was also deprived of a liberty interest, the liberty interest claim should be considered properly preserved for appeal, rather than “raised for the first time on appeal”. 2. Whether a “Rent Administrator’s Order determining the rent overcharge amount and penalties”, which under New York state law is actually an enforceable judgment, also constitutes “property” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3. Whether the same set of alleged facts which was considered by the lower courts for the petitioner’s procedural due process claim should have been considered for the petitioner’s equal protection and substantive due process claims as well, in light of the circumstances of this case and the rulings established in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (‘the concepts of equal protection and due process are not mutually exclusive”; “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”; “equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect a for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in . important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”).