Whether a person who knowingly transfers substantial funds to a designated FTO aids and abets that organization's terrorist acts for purposes of civil liability under JASTA, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2)

QUESTION PRESENTED In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), this Court scrutinized and endorsed Congress’s finding that “[floreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” Jd. at 29 (citation omitted). The Court thus upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which makes it a felony to knowingly provide material support—even for charitable purposes—to entities that the Department of State has designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). Congress subsequently enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016), which provides enhanced relief to Americans injured by terrorist attacks that were committed, planned, or authorized by FTOs. JASTA allows the victims of such attacks to assert a cause of action for aiding and abetting against any person or entity that “knowingly provid[ed] substantial assistance” to the people or entities that committed the attack. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). Congress’s objective was to “provide civil litigants with the broadest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, to seek relief” from any party that “provided material support, directly or indirectly,” to FTOs that injured Americans. JASTA § 2(b). The question presented is: Whether a person who knowingly transfers substantial funds to a designated FTO aids and abets that organization’s terrorist acts for purposes of civil liability under JASTA, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).