Does Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provide immunity from suit to internet platforms in any case arising from the publication of third-party content, regardless of the platform's own misconduct?

QUESTION PRESENTED The Jane Doe plaintiff in this case was sex trafficked as a minor because Facebook’s products connected her with a sex trafficker. The trafficker sold her for sex, allowing men to serially rape her in exchange for money. She was rescued by law enforcement and now seeks to hold Facebook accountable through this action alleging common-law and statutory claims under Texas law. Facebook asserts that it is completely immune from this suit under Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), which provides that “InjJo provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” The Texas Supreme Court concluded that this provision granted Facebook sweeping immunity on all but one of Petitioner’s claims. The court felt constrained by existing precedent to reach that holding, but also emphasized that it expected this Court to conclusively address Section 230’s reach. The question presented is: Does Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provide immunity from suit to internet platforms in any case arising from the publication of third-party content, regardless of the platform’s own misconduct?