Whether courts must implement the traditional summary judgment requirement to consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant when the record includes video evidence

QUESTION PRESENTED Respondent tased Junior Prosper three times and then shot him three times, killing him. Pet. App. 4a. Petitioner, Prosper’s widow, sued Respondent under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Respondent used excessive force. In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Respondent, the Eleventh Circuit stated that security video did not create a genuine question of material fact because the video did “not contradict [Martin]’s statements; at best, it fail[ed] to corroborate them.” Pet. App. 20a. The panel therefore accepted the facts told by Respondent, the only living eyewitness. Pet. App. 2a. In Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014), this Court held that “courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007), this Court held that courts should adopt a nonmovant’s version of facts unless “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,” directing courts to reject any “visible fiction” and view “the facts in the light depicted in the videotape.” Courts have struggled to apply this Court’s guidance to excessive-force cases involving video evidence that may be open to differing interpretations, leading to inconsistent results. The question presented is: Under Scott and Tolan, must courts implement the traditional summary judgment requirement that all evidence be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmovant when the record includes video evidence?