Is telling the jury that their decision is only a mere recommendation unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida?

QUESTION PRESENTED THE COURT: You could recommend an individual be put to death? THE JUROR: But you would be the final — THE COURT: This is why I get the big bucks. Tr. 153. This brief exchange between the trial court and a juror on Jalowiec’s capital case exemplifies the constitutional error in Jalowiec’s case — an error first identified in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985), and later solidified in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016). For the past twenty-five years, Jalowiec has asserted that his death sentence violates the Constitution because the jury selection process systematically undermined the jury’s appreciation of the gravity and responsibility of its decision whether Jalowiec lives or dies. Because Hurst held that all facts necessary to impose a death sentence must be found in accordance with the right to trial by jury, and because Caldwell requires the jury bear the entire responsibility in imposing sentence, the following question is presented: Is telling the jury that their decision is only a mere recommendation unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida? i