Whether the presumptive force of the rule that the testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to convict is a lawful substitute for this Court's rules governing acquittal motions

QUESTION PRESENTED In response to Petitioner’s third and final motion for acquittal under Rule 29(c) Fed. R. Crim. P. the district court ruled that standing alone the government’s eyewitness identification testimony may well have warranted acquittal, given the witnesses’ failure to consistently identify Petitioner as the male robber carrying the sawed-off shotgun during a robbery. To compensate for this failure in proof the courts below claim that the government’s main witness, who those courts deemed an accomplice, testified to sufficient facts to send the case to the jury to determine whether Petitioner was indeed the shotgun toting robber. Accordingly the question presented is: WHETHER THE PRESUMPTIVE FORCE OF THE RULE THAT THE TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT IS A LAWFUL SUBSTITUTE FOR THIS COURT’S RULES GOVERNING ACQUITTAL MOTIONS ESPECIALLY WHERE, AS HERE, THE ACCOMPLICE DENIES BEING AN ACCOMPLICE BUT THE DISTRICT COURT RULES HIM AN ACCOMPLICE ANYWAY, A RULING THE NINTH CIRCUIT SUMMARILY AFFIRMS. ii