Does a post-conviction motion asserting a claim that a sentence violates due process under Johnson v. United States because it was dictated by the residual clause of the pre-Booker mandatory Sentencing Guidelines qualify as a motion that 'asserts' the 'right . . . initially recognized' in Johnson within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)?

QUESTION PRESENTED This petition presents a question that divides the circuits but on which this Court has denied certiorari many times. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari). As explained in the petition, recent developments that have broadened and entrenched the circuit conflict provide good reasons for the Court to finally grant certiorari and resolve this important and recurring issue. A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, provides that a criminal defendant may file a motion to vacate his sentence based on constitutional error within one year of “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). The question presented is: Does a post-conviction motion asserting the following claim—that a sentence violates due process under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), because it was dictated by the residual clause of the pre-Booker mandatory Sentencing Guidelines—qualify as a motion that “assert[s]” the “right . . . initially recognized” in Johnson within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)?