Whether the Sixth Amendment right to autonomy over the objective of one's defense, as recognized in McCoy v. Louisiana, applies retroactively on collateral review

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This case presents the kind of extraordinary circumstances in which this Court exercises its discretionary authority to issue a writ of mandamus. The justification for considering a writ of mandamus in this context is strengthened by the fact that the unusual circumstances of this case would be unlikely to arise frequently. This Court held in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose “the objective of his defense and to insist that his counsel refrain from admitting guilt” even if doing so is considered part of counsel's trial strategy. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1505. Petitioner, Taryn Christian, like Robert McCoy, made it clear beyond any ; doubt, both to his lawyer, and the trial court, that he chose to defend against the charges and assert his innocence. This was especially clear where he plead not guilty, and the defense had proffered three witnesses to testify that a third-party had confessed to the murder. Yet, over petitioner’s express objection and request to testify before closing argument, trial counsel reversed the defense’s position from its opening statement arguing actually innocence, to then, in closing summation, argued petitioner had committed the murder—but had acted in “self-defense.” Upon habeas review, the district court granted relief under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), finding petitioner was denied his right to present a defense of a third-party’s confession to the crime—holding that the credibility of corroborating “confession” witnesses was for the jury to decide and not the trial court. In denying petitioner’s Sixth Amendment [autonomy] claim, the district court attached no constitutional significance to a defendant’s protected right to insist that counsel not concede guilt or the “structural” error that resulted from its violation. Applying a narrow reading of Strickland, the habeas court held that trial counsel’s actions in closing argument was “reasonable” strategy under Strickland, on the grounds that the trial court had excluded three witnesses from testifying to a thirdparty’s admissions. The district court’s reasoning reflects the conclusion that defense counsel, not the defendant, controlled the decision whether to admit guilt. Such reasoning posited a conflict between the Sixth Amendment right to defend against the charges and that of having the assistance of counsel. A decade later, petitioner filed a timely Rule 60(d)(1) independent action in the district court invoking McCoy under the “grave miscarriage of justice” standard in United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998). The district court transferred the motion to the Court of Appeals as an unauthorized “application” to file an SOS petition. Without relying on precedent, a three-judge panel designated the Rule 60()(1) as a successive “application” subject to the constraints of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1). In its decision, the three-judge panel took the unprecedented step to ignore the 2008 habeas judgment altogether, and instead, assumed the district court’s role as factfinder in the first instance—to decide “facts” contrary to the record. In this endeavor, the panel held that trial counsel “never conceded Christian's guilt’ by i reasoning, that ‘throughout the trial” counsel argued “that Christian was innocent and contested the state’s identification of Christian” as the one who stabbed the victim. Christian v. Thomas, No. 19-70036 (9 Circuit December 14, 2020). By substituting its own judgment over that of the district court, the panel improperly engaged in independent fact-finding outside of the record. As the record documents trial counsel admitted identification, and in jaw dropping performance in re-enacting the stabbing, argued that under great duress petitioner had committed the murder in “self-defense.” In deciding that petitioner had failed to make a prima facie showing that the “facts” of his case “relies on” McCoy, the panel rejecte