Does enjoining both courts in contradictory reliance on faux removal of a 100% exempt parcel (11 U.S.C.) revested in Petitioner before removal from the state's in rem petition, forever seal the fate, post-repose, of all Respondents' inactions and actions forever thereafter, as being absolutely moot; unlabeled as either a 'tax case' or a 'bankruptcy case' by exemption, followed by repose set in state law, to give Petitioner federal subject-matter jurisdiction in addition to what she had, since Monroe v. Pape (1961), August 29, 2019?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Context: A repose fixed on March 2018especially a self-imposed repose, created by one Respondent solely misinterpreting federal law in a state-court in rem matter —here, a civil version of Michigan v. Long — “confirmling]” facts untrue related to 11 U.S.C., e.g. inclusion in “inventory” of 100% exempted real property, to erroneously extend (equitably toll?) repose “a year” in faux abeyance from March 2017. Tactically, obstacles to the consequential appellate court demands for cash payment, forbidden pre-foreclosure by MCL 211.78k(2) and post-foreclosure by 11 U.S.C, said Respondent thus blocked Petitioner's in rem objections MCL 211.78k(2)(a-f), to in tum block any claim of appeal thereafter; thus ultimately blocking Petitioner’s constitutional rights in several ways. Post-repose, second Respondent, in a federal court, separate from the underlying bankruptcy case, revealed the false abeyance. Both represented the same third municipal Respondent in separate courts. All three are lawyers. All knowledgeable in the laws involved. It was reframed and precluded federal jurisdiction unconstitutionally rooted in a quid pro quo created by the confirming one, done on behalf of the same third one. The latter third one had no standing in federal court August 7, 2017, to reveal the first one’s initial independent decision to allegedly remove the parcel, March 22, 2017. Yet, the federal court also relied upon it. This doubly harmed Petitioner in both courts by surprise, August 7, 2017. The QUESTIONS PRESENTED are therefore: 1. Does enjoining both courts in contradictory reliance on faux removal of a 100% exempt parcel (11 U.S.C.) revested in Petitioner before removal from the state’s in rem petition, forever seal the fate, post-repose, of all Respondents’ inactions and actions forever thereafter, as being absolutely moot; unlabeled as either a “tax case” or a “bankruptcy case” by exemption, followed by repose set in state law, to give Petitioner federal subject-matter jurisdiction in addition to what she had, since Monroe v. Pape (1961), August 29, 2019? 2. Does the Michigan v. Long misuse of federal law by Respondents Yun, on behalf of Sabree, creating faux removal, revealed by Kilpatrick, give this Court a perfect vehicle to extend Michigan v. Long's application to civil matters that hoard all excess profit which a trustee liquidation would make available to Debtor and other creditors, such that Sabree “walked in the shoes” of the trustee in a state court, which Kilpatrick, in January 2017, told Petitioner “survive the bankruptcy”; declared August 7, 2017 it did not; Sabree reversed it, invoking by preemption in 2019, Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, which cited Monroe v. Pape (1961)? ” i