Whether a rogue correctional officer's unlawful retaliation against an inmate for utilizing an administrative grievance process implicates the sort of sensitive, policy-based judgments that present special Bivens factors under this Court's precedent

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that federal officers may be subject to individual-capacity damages liability directly under the U.S. Constitution if they violate its provisions, id. at 389. But before a court can recognize the availability of a Bivens remedy in any given context, it must conclude that “no special factors counsel[] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Jd. at 396. Factors that counsel hesitation include the risk of interfering in “high-level policies” likely to “attract the attention of Congress,” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 1387S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017), but not the risk of influencing individual, low-level officers’ day-to-day “efforts to perform their official duties,” Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). This question presented is: Whether a rogue correctional officer’s unlawful retaliation against an inmate for utilizing an administrative grievance process implicates the sort of sensitive, policy-based judgments that present special Bivens factors under this Court’s precedent. i