Whether a district court's failure to inquire into an indigent defendant's colorable motion for substitution of counsel is cognizable on direct appeal, or whether it must instead be raised on collateral review as a Strickland-ineffectiveness claim

QUESTION PRESENTED The Third Circuit panel majority, deepening an acknowledged and entrenched circuit split, ruled that the district court’s failure to inquire into Senke’s well-grounded motion for substitution of trial counsel (a failure that the Panel unanimously found) is not cognizable on direct appeal, because Senke is an indigent defendant and must therefore raise the issue on collateral review as a Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ineffectiveness claim, with a showing of Strickland prejudice. By contrast, seven Circuits—the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth—apply abuse-of-discretion review to a district court’s denial of, or failure to properly inquire into, a defendant’s substitution motion, without distinguishing between indigent and non-indigent defendants and without requiring a demonstration of prejudice. Besides the Third Circuit panel majority in the instant case, only two circuits, the D.C. and Seventh, have consistently treated this issue as one of Strickland ineffectiveness for indigent defendants. The question presented is whether a district court’s failure to inquire into an indigent defendant’s colorable motion for substitution of counsel is cognizable on direct appeal, or whether it must instead be raised on collateral review as a Strickland ineffectiveness claim. i