Does the Court have the power to review a State Collateral Review Court's failure to give Retroactive Effect to new substantive rules of Federal Constitutional Law under the Teague Framework?

No question identified. : en . . Page# i : . . | ; 1. Jurisdiction and. the Teague_ Standard: , Does the Court have ‘the power to review a State Collateral Review Court's failure to give Retroactive Effect to new substantive rules , of Federal Constitutional Law under the Teague Framework? 2. Montgomery's Expansion Of Miller's Standard: (A). Daes the Court's logic of Roper, Graham, Miller, Montgomery & : Adams, which prohibit under the Eighth Amendment mandatory Life Senttences without Parole for Juvenile Offenders, announce a new substantive. Constitutional rule that was retroactive on State Collateral Review even for, basically whether Montgomery expanded Miller's holding, and whether any such expansion can be applied retroactively? , . (B). What is to be done with cases where a juvenile is sentenced to life with the possibility of Parole arising only-after an extraordin; arily lengthy term of years that exceed the juvenile's life expectan~ ety constituting de facto Life Without Parole? . 3. Can. Lower. Court's Circumvent Miller: : (A). Is it now allowable, after a review of the logic of Roper, Graham, Miller, Montgomery & Adams, which unavoidably extends not only to de jure Life Without Parole, but also to de facto ones, for a : Lower Court to Circumvent-Miller by sentencing a juvenile to a tern of years beyond his life span? ; (B). Is N.Y. State's Sentencing of Juveniles as if they were not children, sentencing them to die-in-prisan that exceeds his life expectancy, defying decency without considering the fact thet he is a child, and making the sentence all that counts, without consideration of rehabilitation, a circumvention of Miller? . 4a. Retroactive ; (A). Petitioner has a sentence of 92 yrs-to-Life, did the Bronx © Court err in ruling that the retroactive effect did not apply to Petitioner's de facto Life Without Parole (Functional Equivalent of ‘ ; L.W.P.), who will die in prisen, has been in prison for 33 yrs since he was 17 yrs old, has more time in prison than. he was alive in free } society, with 60 yrs to go, is mow 50 yrs old with diabetes, also ~ | short life expectency, who was denied even a hearing? . | (8B). Whether the cruel & unusual clause in the N.Y.S. Constitution, : | as in the U.S. Constitution, is also violated whan Petitioner was : sentenced to 92. yrs to Life and he was a juvenile at the time of ; | crime...where Bronx Judge never once mentioned Petitioner's YOUTH | "when he sentenced teenage defendant to die in prison under abuse of: : discretionary powers...? . ; 5. Increase.in. the. Minimum. Activates-Due. Process. Clauses: : Here the Petitioner has been sentenced ta 92 yrs to Life as a : teenager, does the due process of U.S. Constitution, or N.Y.S. Const, itution, require that a factual determination, authorizing an increa. of the Prison Sentence, for, an.offense that is ' not to exceed the 25. year-Minimum for Second Degree Uffenses of Murder, but by a judge an basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt? ; 6. Functional Equivalent for 2nd Degree . Crimes As-If-1stDegree Conviction Occurred: . (A). Whether the Functional Equivalent Factor can stand against. ‘ Petitioner, whose crimes occurred when he was 17 yrs old, under.the age for N.Y.!s 1st Degree Murder Offense to apply, but He was convicted by a Bronx Jury to Second-Degree Murder, a lesser included offense, but then this.factor allows a "judge" to enhance sentence by imp: esing punishment identical to what NY provides for 1st Degree Crimes? (8B). Does the Apprendi Standard apply, where the sentence imposed is greater than the prescribed statutory laws for the offense of 2nd — : . Degree Murder (25 yrs-to-Life), here Petitioner was sentenced beyond the statutory laws to 92 yrs-to-Life, it exceeds the 25 year Maximum. for the crime created by NYS Legislature (where Parole is denied, heyond ones life expectancy) after allowing a Bronx Jury to convict Petitioner of 2nd Degree Crimes? ot , Page# 4i | | 7. Vindictive. Sentencing. & All