Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes retrial for attempted murder after acquittal for murder in self-defense

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner shot on his property in quick succession two armed and threatening trespassers, who were father and son. He shot the father when he marched up to within close range of him while holding a handgun. He then shot the son, who was already within close range of Petitioner, when he saw him draw his weapon and start to point it at Petitioner upon seeing Petitioner shoot his father. The first trespasser shot by Petitioner survived but the second died, and Petitioner was charged with attempted murder and murder. A jury acquitted him of the murder charge but hung on the attempted murder. A second jury at a retrial found him guilty of the attempted murder. The Indiana Court of Appeals held that the retrial and conviction for attempted murder was precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A federal district court found the Indiana Supreme Court’s subsequent decision affirming the conviction unreasonable for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), on the ground that it addressed a “straw-man” argument instead of Petitioner’s actual argument or the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, but nevertheless denied habeas relief on an alternate ground not argued or presented by the parties. The Seventh Circuit, in a Per Curiam opinion, did not mention the district court’s alternate ground for denial, but knocked down the same “straw man” knocked down by the Indiana Supreme Court, and then in one sentence dismissed Petitioner’s actual argument without explanation as “implausible,” “based on state law,” and “evidently found wanting” by the “state’s highest court.” The questions presented are: 1. Whether, even after Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U. S.__, 188 S. Ct. 1188 (2018), when the last state court to decide a prisoner's federal claim explains its decision on the merits in a reasoned opinion, but only gives reasons that knock down a “straw man” not briefed or argued by the prisoner, a federal habeas court must still defer to that state court's ultimate ruling, even though the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale ruled for the prisoner. 2. Whether the Seventh Circuit properly applied the issue-preclusive aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause with the “realism and rationality” required by this Court in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), where the Seventh Circuit found the State of Indiana was not forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause from attempting to criminally convict Petitioner at a retrial for the first of two immediately connected shootings, even though a prior jury at an earlier trial had already acquitted Petitioner for the second shooting on the ground of self-defense, after being instructed that a person cannot have acted in self-defense if he provoked, instigated, or participated willingly in the violence.