Whether an indigent prisoner's incorporation by reference of constitutional pleadings in the district court is adequate to state a valid claim on appeal, or if reproducing the claims in a petition for panel rehearing is acceptable

QUESTION(s) PRESENTED The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has denied a COA in this Cause by applying Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) in a vague and conclusory manner which circumvents the required threshold procedural inquiry and carefully avoids material evidence. 1. Under a de novo review standard, if an indigent prisoner proceeds on appeal under Fed.R.App.P. 24(a)(3), and requests leave to use the Original Record under Rule 24(c), is the incorporation by reference to the constitutional pleadings made in the district court adequate to state a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right? Or is it otherwise acceptable to "reproduc[e]" the valid constitutional claims in a Rule 40 petition for panel rehearing? 2. Did the Court of Appeals err in refusing to issue a COA regarding statutory or equitable tolling, where the District Court's denial overlooked every fact affirming diligence and relied entirely upon ; a complete failure to acknowledge the presentation of evidence which conclusively demonstrates that the pro se litigant had been actively misled by a court into pursuing an other State collateral "review" to a higher court, which would otherwise have never been pursued? 3. Does the "narrow exception" recognized in Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) suggest that “extra-ordinary circumstances" may exist in Texas which per se satisfy the second prong of Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)? Or does closer inspection of the structurally deficient circumstances which persist in the wake of Trevino justify further corrective measures, such as holding the State of Texas to have electively disentitled themselves from asserting affirmative defenses in federal habeas proceedings? i