whether-unknowing-use-of-false-testimony-violates-due-process

questions presented are: (a) Whether the district court erred to deny relief by reliance on the Fifth Circuit ruling in Kinsel v. Cain, 647 F. 3d 265, 272 that "because prosecution did not know that vic| tim's statements were false. Petitioner failt to demonstrate a due process violation"; (b) Whether the district court was authorized to substitute its own interpretation of the State law for that of the Court of Criminal Appeals? Or to contest a well-settled State law? In Schad v. Arizona, 111 S.Ct. 2491, this Court held: "Supreme . Court is not free to substitute its own interpretation of state statutes for those of state's courts"; (c) Whether the State Court's interpretation of State law was binding on the federal district court? In Bradshaw v. Richey, 126 S.Ct. 603, this Court observed: "A state court's inter. pretation of state law...binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus"; (d) Whether the Fifth Circuit's decision in Kinsel v. Cain, supra is even applicable to Texas cases where it conflicts with the Texas Highest Criminal Court's precedents on unknowing use of false testimony; and : i . (e) Whether the lower courts created a question of law on unknowing use of false testimony in Texas which requires legal clarity from this Court ?:See RuLe_10.In other words, in which manner should the Texas courts resolve the issue of unknowing use of false testimony in the future? Should the courts decide the issue in accordance with the interpretation of the T.C.C.A. that even unknowing use of false testimony violates a defendant's due process rights? Or should the courts adopt the Fifth Circuit's approach that it does not? 2. The Supreme Court has clearly established that "prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83. This Court has further held, "Government's failure to assist defense by disclosing information that might have been helpful in conducting cross~examination amounts to constitutional violation." U.S. v. Bagley, 105 S.Ct. 3375. In the present case, the post-trial discoveries have established that the prosecution willfully refused to disclose to defense two key witnesses whose testimonies tend to negate the guilt of Petitioner. | Considering the foregoing, the questions presented are: | (a) Whether "the prosecution is guilty of misconduct when he deliberately suppresses evidence that is clearly relevant and favorable to the defense, regardless once again, whether the evidence relates directly to testimony given in the course of governments case?" See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 121; and | (b) Whether the State's suppression of favorable evidence that im; peaches the credibility of a government witness whose testimony may well be determinative of guilt or innocence is reversible error under Brady? See Giglio v. U.S., 92 S.Ct. 763. ii | 3. Neither the district court, nor the Fifth Circuit addressed the underlying legal question in this case, whether the State had a constitutional obligation to disclose to defense withheld testimonies of two key witnesses under Brady. In regard to this issue, the questions presented are: (a) Whether the district court's refusal to adjudicate Petitioner's Brady claim violated his constitutionally protected rights under Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment? Or conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. See Rules of Supreme Court, Rule 10(c); (b) Whether the exclusion of material witesses had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict under O'Neal.v. McAninch, 513 U.S. at 436; (c) Whether the suppressed testimonies violated Petitioner's fundamental rights to present a complete defense under Crane v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. at 2146; or (d) Whether the violation of Petitioner's rights to present a complete defense was a structural error under Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S.Ct. 1899 (2017). 4. "A defendant in a fed