Does the Due Process Clause prohibit review of the entire record to determine whether a guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED George Brinkman confessed to murdering a mother and her two daughters. In the face of overwhelming evidence, Brinkman, represented by counsel, chose to enter a guilty plea to the indictment. Fifty-two years ago, the Court held that due process requires an affirmative showing that a guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Boykin held that the waiver of constitutional rights during a plea cannot be presumed from a silent record, but it did not limit what a reviewing court can consider. Despite a lack of objection, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated Brinkman's plea finding that due process can only be satisfied by a narrow review of the plea proceedings-a standard the Court has never previously required. The Supreme Court of Ohio's "presumption of prejudice" standard conflicts with decisions from the Court as well as nearly all other state and federal courts. The two questions presented for the Court are: 1. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit review of the entire record to determine whether a_ guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered? 2. Should this Court grant certiorari to resolve the conflict among the courts on whether the failure to strictly adhere to the advisement of rights in Boykin should result in the automatic reversal of a guilty plea?