Jason William Custer v. Scott R. Frakes, Director, Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, et al.
AdministrativeLaw DueProcess FourthAmendment CriminalProcedure HabeasCorpus JusticiabilityDoctri
When trial and direct appeal counsel are one and the same, can a pauper defendant's due process rights be undermined when the state refuses to appoint counsel for the first collateral postconviction attack?
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED This is a First Degree Murder case, which resulted in the finding of guilt on all charges and a Life Without the Possibility (LWOP) sentence plus and additinal 30 70 years for Use of a Weapon, and Possession of a | Weapon by a Prohibited Person. | Trial and direct appeal counsel were one and the same, therefore, they wer | unable or unwilling to assign ineffectiveness of counsel claims on him/herself on direct appeal, as a result of a myriad of ineffectiveness claim(s) that would have otherwise been assigned and argued. Additionally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must_be_ brought on direct appeal in Nebraska, otherwise they are forfeited, even though any ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought on direct appeal by the same who represented the defendant at trial are premature and should be addressed __ | at the postconviction stage. Under Nebraska law, a defendant waives ineffective assistance of counsel | claims unless he or she raises them during their first state collateral review | proceeding, even though the court refused to appoint counsel on postconviction, even though the judge knew Custer had had the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Thus, Custer has had no other member of the Bar review his trial/direct appeal counsel's performance, denying him both equal protection and due proces of law per the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Custer's jury instructions were incorrect and incomplete, and prosecutors used his post-Miranda silence to undermine both his credibility and as an | indicator of his guilt to the jury. Question #1: When trial and direct appeal counsel are one and the same, not allowing for direct appeal counsel to assign and argue any ineffective assistance of counsel claims on him/herself on direct appeal, are the due process rights of a pauper defendant undermined when the state postconviction and/or appellate court(s) refuse to appoint counsel for a pauper prisoner's first collateral postconviction attack on his conviction (First Degree Murder/Use of a Weapon/Possession of a Weapon by a Prohibited Person), especially in light of the fact that the State (Nebraska) mandates that ineffective assistance of trial/appeal counsel claims be assigned and argued on direct appeal or forfeit thus subjected to procedural bar in subsequent proceedings.? Question #2: If a requested "choice of evils" jury instruction is arbitrarily denied by the trial court as inappropriate on the facts of the case, and/or counsel fails to request, or the court fails to furnish a self-defense instruction, does this undermine the right to due process of law and a fair ~— trial per the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments? Question #3: Should a First Degree Murder conviciton be vacated if deliberate and premeditated malice or premeditation were neither instructed nor defined correctly in the jury instructions, which are all requisite elements of the charge upon which the conviction rests, undermining the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendment rights of the defendant? Question #4: Is it fundamentally wrong per Doyle for prosecutors to repeat— | edly use a defendant's silence at the time of arrest AND after receiving Miranda warnings to argue the defendant's credibility, or lack thereof, or as an indication of guilt, wihout infringing upon fundamental federal constitutional rights preserved in the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments's of the U.S. Constitution, such as the right to remain silent, the right to speak to a i